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able to satisfy. The new procedure appears to be ideal for the
settlement of existing disputes which the parties desire to be settled
according to the rules of substantive law and with the right of
appeal. Whether it will be incorporated in contracts as a means
for the settlement of future disputes is questionable. 06  The ob-
stacle of overcoming human inertia and resistance to change imposes
an immediate burden upon the Simplified Procedure. Much re-
mains to be seen. If the procedure receives sufficient publicity
and trial by the business community, it may be a reform of great
significance. Its success or failure will, in large measure, depend
upon the cooperation of judges and attorneys in accomplishing its
announced aim, that is, "a simplified method of litigation which
combines the chief advantages of arbitration . . . with the chief
advantages of traditional common law trials-the adherence to
recognized principles of substantive law, the right to trial by jury
if desired, and the right to appeal. ,107
)X
THE EFFECT OF ESTOPPEL ON THE RECOGNITION OF
SISTER STATE DIVORCE DECREES IN NEW YORK
In general, estoppel may be defined as a prohibition against
the knowledgeable assumption of an obviously inconsistent position
in relation to previous acts.' Within the context of a marital con-
troversy, its immediate effect is to prohibit a party from asserting
the invalidity of a decree of divorce.2  This note will discuss the
circumstances under which, and the parties against whom, the
estoppel may be generally applied.
In order to properly appraise the law of estoppel in cases where
a decree of divorce is attacked on jurisdictional grounds, it is first
106 See Weinstein, Notes on Proposed Revision of the New York Arbitra-
tion Law, 16 ARB. J. (n.s.) 61, 65 (1961).
107 1960 LEG. Doc. No. 98, at 103.
1 See McCLINTOCK, EQUrTY 79 (2d ed. 1948). For a treatment of the
origin of estoppel see 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 802 (5th ed.
1941).
2 In Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940), this judicial
impediment was treated as a quasi-estoppel because the court said it was not
a true estoppel although its effect was the same. See Borenstein v. Borenstein,
151 Misc. 160, 270 N.Y. Supp. 688 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 242 App. Div. 761,
274 N.Y. Supp. 1011 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 407, 3 N.E.2d 844 (1936),
wherein the court stated that this was not an estoppel and that no one has
defined what it is. For convenience it shall be hereinafter referred to as
"estoppel"
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necessary to properly delimit its application within the ambit of other
inhibitions against such attack.
Background
In New York State, adultery is the only ground sufficient to
justify the granting of an absolute divorce.3 However, a domiciliary
is not prohibited from abandoning his present domicile to avoid this
limited availability of a divorce.4 He is at liberty to take up
domicile r within a jurisdiction where there are liberal grounds for
3 N.Y. CIm. PRAc. Acr § 1147. Historically, only the ecclesiastical courts
had jurisdiction of a matrimonial action. They could dissolve a marriage only
in limited situations. After Henry VIII invalidated the papal authority in
England, Parliament assumed exclusive jurisdiction to grant an absolute di-
vorce. It was not until the passage of the Matrimonial Causes Act. 20 & 21
Vict. c. 85 (1857), that the common-law courts were vested with authority
to decree an absolute divorce. In the colonies, divorce power was either in
the governor and his council or the colonial legislature. This power was
seldom exercised. See Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopk. Ch. 557 (N.Y. 1825). After
the Revolution, the power to grant divorces was vested in the courts by
legislative acts. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Erkenbrach v.
Erkenbrach, 96 N.Y. 456 (1884).
4 In all state courts the law which determines the existence of grounds for
divorce is not the law of the situs in which the alleged acts occurred, but
the law of the forum. The rule, which is apparently contrary to the concept
of choice of law obtaining in other fields, is defended on the ground that the
policy of the forum should govern. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 135 (a)(1934); 2 BIsHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 164 (1891). "If
one of the parties to a marriage leaves the state of matrimonial domicile to
seek a divorce elsewhere, a defendant might well answer-if obliged to answer
at all-that such forum must give full faith and credit to the statutes of the
state of actual domicile." Ibid. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lauyer's
Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUm. L. Rav. 1, 14 (1945), citing CooK, THE
LoGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLIcr OF LAWS 463-64 (1942). Simi-
larly, the operation of the doctrine of estoppel is determined by the law of the
forum where the decree is being attacked and not the law of the jurisdiction
which granted the divorce. Senor v. Senor, 272 App. Div. 306, 311, 70
N.Y.S.2d 909, 913 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd inen., 297 N.Y. 800, 78 N.E.2d 20
(1948).
s Domicile is a traditional notion common to the English-speaking courts.
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 234 (1945). Since 1789 no court
has questioned domicile as a jurisdictional prerequisite of judicial power to
grant a divorce. Id. at 229. See STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§200, 218, 219 (1st ed. 1834), where the theory may have originated.
For the acquisition of domicile there must be an absence of any present in-
tention of not residing there permanently or indefinitely. Gilbert v. David,
235 U.S. 561, 569 (1915). For example, the intent cannot be to reside in the
new locality as a matter of temporary expediency such as solely to acquire
a divorce. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624 (1914). See 2 BIs]EoP,
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 111 (1891).
However, there is a possibility that a state may not be under a legal duty
to abide by the time-honored doctrine that "divorce jurisdiction" must be
founded on domicile. It is possible that the state may adopt instead, as Mr.
Justice Rutledge has suggested, "some minimal establishment of more than
1961 ]
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the dissolution of the marital status.6
The United States Supreme Court has held that when there is
domicile of the plaintiff-spouse within the divorce-rendering state,
that state may exercise its powers over the marital relationship. 7
Consequently, when an ex parte divorce is decreed, the full faith
and credit clause of the federal constitution requires all other states
to respect that decree." This ex parte dissolution of a marriage
will be given full recognition even though it is contrary to the public
policy of the state in which the marriage formerly existed and in
which the "stay-at-home" spouse still resides. 9
The jurisdictional validity of an ex parte divorce is bottomed
on the fiction that a divorce action is an action in rem, the res
casual or transitory relations in the new community, giving the newcomer
something of objective substance identifying him with its life . . . with the
subjective [domicile] removed. . . ." Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226, 259-60 (1945) (dissenting opinion). In Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667
(3d Cir. 1953), it was held that a statute of the Virgin Islands providing for
personal appearance of both spouses as presumptive evidence of domicile
violates due process. The Supreme Court granted certiorari but the question
was dismissed as moot when one spouse procured a second divorce in another
jurisdiction. 347 U.S. 610 (1954). See also Granville-Smith v. Granville-
Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1954), wherein it was held that the Virgin Islands statute
was invalid because it exceeded the power granted the Island Legislature by
Congress. In New York, by virtue of N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1147(4), the
court has jurisdiction of a divorce action when the parties are married within
the state notwithstanding the fact that both are domiciled without the state.
See David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct.
1954).
6 The contract of marriage "is something more than an ordinary contract.
It is a contract resulting in a status to which certain unalterable rights and
obligations are attached .. " Anonymous v. Anonymous, 49 N.Y.S.2d 314, 318
(Sup. Ct. 1944). The rules and principles of the law of contracts have very
little bearing upon the marriage relation. Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856).
See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
629 (1819), wherein it is stated that marriage is not a contract within the
meaning of article I, section 10 of the Constitution which precludes the states
from impairing contract obligations. Such a relationship is denominated a
status. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 119 (1934). "It is an in-
stitution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply in-
terested. . .". Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). See also Williams
v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945).
7 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
8 Ibid. However, a previous judicial establishment of "right to support"
is not affected by a subsequent foreign ex parte divorce which terminates the
status of the parties. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) ; Morris,
Divisible Divorce 64 HARv. L. REV. 1287 (1951). However, if the foreign
court has in personam jurisdiction of the defendant, it has the power to
determine the terms of the divorce although the wife had previously obtained
rights in a separation action in New York. Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193,
97 N.E.2d 748, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
9 Williams v. North Carolina, supra note 5; see Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175,
178 (1901).
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being the marital status. As an action in rem, it must be brought
where the res is located, and that is the domicile of either spouse.
However, in an ex parte proceeding there cannot be a con-
clusive finding of the fact of domicile.1 0 The plaintiff must be
in fact domiciled within the jurisdiction of the court in order for a
decree of divorce to be valid. Therefore, upon suit brought by an
interested party, a sister state may always validly review the evi-
dence of domicile. It may redetermine whether there was such
domicile in fact as to empower the court to render an ex parte
divorce. If there was not, then the decree is invalid for lack of
jurisdiction of the subject matter. As a result it is not entitled to
the protection of the full faith and credit clause."
Thus, it may be seen that estoppel is to be considered only
after the res judicata-full faith and credit issues as to a party's
standing 12 to attack the former divorce are resolved in favor of the
10 "To permit the necessary finding of domicil by one State to foreclose all
States in the protection of their social institutions would be intolerable."
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945). When a court re-
litigates the question of domicile, it is at liberty to consider facts unknown to
the court which rendered the divorce. The fact that the plaintiff, in an ex
parte action for divorce, left immediately after the award of the decree
reflects on his original intent and may negative the finding of domicile in the
sister state. See Schneider v. Schneider, 281 App. Div. 250, 119 N.Y.S.2d
337 (1st Dep't 1953) (per curiam).
11 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the . . . judicial
Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1958) (statutory implementation). However, a final judgment of a court
without having had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action is void in
the state of rendition and is therefore not entitled to the protection of the
Constitution. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) ; Thompson v. Whitman,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873).
12 In determining the scope of the protection afforded the decree by the
full faith and credit clause, an important distinction must be made between
an ex parte divorce and those wherein the defendant has made an appearance.
In the former, the reviewing state's scope of inquiry into the jurisdictional
basis for the divorce is complete, and may be invoked by any person whom
the reviewing state sees fit to give standing to so invoke. However, in the
latter, the Supreme Court, in Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938), stated that
where the parties to a divorce proceeding litigate the jurisdiction of the court
making the award, the question is foreclosed from collateral attack by the
parties to the action in a subsequent proceeding. Accord, Schneider v. Schneider,
232 App. Div. 71, 73, 249 N.Y. Supp. 131, 133 (2d Dep't 1931); Tiedemann
v. Tiedemann, 172 App. Div. 819, 158 N.Y. Supp. 851 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd
inem., 225 N.Y. 709, 122 N.E. 892 (1919), appeal dismissed, 251 U.S. 536
(1919). In Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), the Court applied the
principle of res judicata against the parties in respect to jurisdictional authority,
even though jurisdiction was not'a contested question, provided both parties had
made a personal appearance and there had been an opportunity to question the
jurisdiction of the court Accord, Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948) ; Frost v.
Frost, 260 App. Div. 694, 696, 23 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (1st Dep't 1940). In this
event, the sister state court, where the decree is being collaterally attacked,
must construe the law of the divorcing state to determine whether that state's
1961 ]
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party. In short, even if one is otherwise able to attack the validity
of a prior divorce, his conduct may yet estop him from doing so.
Estoppel Against the Procurer of the Divorce
An early illustration of the concept of estoppel is the New
York case of Starbuck v. Starbuck.13 There, the plaintiff sought
the enforcement of her dower right against the estate of her alleged
husband. To succeed, it was necessary for her to prove the
invalidity of a divorce decree she had obtained in a sister state.
She alleged that the former forum was without jurisdiction to
dissolve the marital relationship because she had not been a dom-
iciliary of that state at the time the ex parte decree was rendered.
Subsequent to the divorce the alleged husband had remarried and
there were minor dependents of that union. The Court of Appeals
estopped the plaintiff from attacking the validity of the decree,
reasoning that a party who has procured an invalid decree of
divorce by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of another state
cannot thereafter be heard in this state to question that jurisdiction.14
Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff was truly the widow of the
deceased, she was estopped from proving it in the action.' 5
law permits a collateral attack by such third party. Johnson v. Muelberger,
340 U.S. 581 (1951); Widera v. Widera, 113 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
13 173 N.Y. 503, 66 N.E. 193 (1903).
14 Cf. Borenstein v. Borenstein, 151 Misc. 160, 270 N.Y. Supp. 688 (Sup.
Ct. 1934), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 407, 3 N.E.2d, 844 (1936), in which the parties were
divorced in Mexico, but the wife subsequently procured a divorce in California,
in which the husband appeared voluntarily. The wife instituted the instant
suit to reduce the California money award to judgment in New York. One
of the defenses that the husband interposed was that the Mexican divorce
was valid in all respects and therefore there existed no marital res over which
the California court could acquire jurisdiction. The court held that the husband
by voluntarily submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the California court
was estopped from collaterally attacking that court's determination.
15 Accord, In the Matter of Estate of Swales, 60 App. Div. 599,
30 N.Y. Supp. 220 (4th Dep't 1901), aff'd, 172 N.Y. 651, 65 N.E. 1122
(1902); Matter of Morris, 52 Hun 102, 5 N.Y. Supp. 90 (1st Dep't), aff'd
mere., 117 N.Y. 638, 22 N.E. 1130 (1889). Cf. Hewitt v. Northrup, 75 N.Y.
506, 510 (1878); Matter of Gonzalez, 6 Misc. 2d 118, 156 N.Y.S.2d 28
(Surr. Ct. 1956). See N.Y. DEcW. EsT. LAW §87(b) which disallows a
spouse to claim his intestate share when he has procured, without the state,
an invalid divorce.
A wife who obtained an invalid sister state divorce was estopped from
asserting its invalidity in a separation action instituted against the same
husband. Hyman v. Hyman, 65 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd mere.,
263 App. Div. 814, 32 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1st Dep't 1941). A wife who obtained
an invalid decree of divorce in a sister state was estopped from collaterally
attacking that decree in an action to annul her second marriage. See Rosenberg
v. Perles, 182 Misc. 727, 50 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1944). Where a husband
had procured an invalid decree of divorce, he was estopped from collaterally
attacking that decree when the wife instituted suit to enforce the alimony
[ VOL. 36
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A logical projection of the Starbuck principle should preclude
one who procured an invalid decree from thereafter maintaining an
action for separation or divorce against the non-appearing spouse.
In such actions it is necessary to plead and prove the existence
of a marriage.' 6 The plaintiff, in order to prove a subsisting mar-
riage would be compelled to collaterally attack the previous decree
of divorce. However, in Stevens v. Stevens' 7 an action by a wife
for separation in which the husband counterclaimed for divorce, the
court distinguished the principle of the Starbuck case. In Stevens,
the wife contended that the husband, who had procured a prior
invalid decree of divorce, should be estopped from obtaining a divorce
on his counterclaim because he could not collaterally attack his pre-
vious decree which purported to dissolve the marriage. Neither
party to the marriage had remarried. The Court of Appeals, in
refusing to estop the husband, reasoned that in the case before it,
unlike the Starbuck case, it was pronouncing judgment directly upon
the marital status.' s This was a relationship which the prior conduct
of the parties could not alter. The court was not concerned with
an attempt to assert a private claim arising out of the marriage as
it had been in Starbuck, and distinguished the cases on those grounds.
The court itself limited its decision to the precise facts before it,
and did not inquire into what the result would be in some future
event that had not happened.'" The Stevens remedy provides a
means to settle matrimonial confusion.2 0  The rationale of the de-
cision is that since the parties are without the power to alter
their marital status by themselves, the state may declare in
a proper situation, exactly what effect an invalid decree of divorce
has on the marriage. 21  The court was asked to pronounce
awarded to her. Tenny v. Tenny, 36 N.Y.S.2d 704 (Sup. Ct. 1942). See gen-
erally 2 Bisnop, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 187 (1891).
16 In every action for separation or divorce the primary fact to be proved
is an existing marriage between the parties. Statter v. Statter, 2 N.Y.2d
668, 143 N.E.2d 10, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1957); Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N.Y.
463, 173 N.E. 680 (1930). See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 1147, 1161.
17 273 N.Y. 157, 7 N.E.2d 26 (1937).
is See Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E.2d 423 (1943), wherein the
court stated that one who procures a foreign decree is estopped from col-
laterally attacking it in an action to enforce private rights, but he may have a
full adjudication of his marital status. "[lit is now established that a foreign
decree has no effect upon the right of either party [to the valid marriage]
to a full adjudication in a marital action of their marital status ... "
Mintz v. Mintz, 34 N.Y.S.2d 242, 243 (Sup. Ct. 1942). (Emphasis added.)
See Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940) (dissenting
opinion).19 Stevens v. Stevens, supra note 17, at 159, 7 N.E2d at 27.2 Ibid. But see Astor v. Astor, 6 Misc. 2d 967, 160 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup.
C.), motion for reargument granted and original determination adhered to,
162 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
21 Ibid. Senor v. Senor, 272 App. Div. 306, 312, 70 N.Y.S.2d 909, 911
1961]
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judgment directly upon the marital status in Senor v. Senor.22  The
wife, who had procured a prior invalid decree, instituted suit for a
declaratory judgment that the sister state decree of divorce was in-
valid. If this were all that appeared, then according to the Stevens
holding, there would be no estoppel applied against the procurer. How-
ever, the wife also sought a separation decree with large alimony pay-
ments. The court realized that the wife desired the judicial re-establish-
ment of the marital relationship only as a means of obtaining alimony
payments. The court estopped the wife from asserting the invalidity
of the prior decree and declared that the state has no intention of
being subservient to the vagaries of those who play "fast and
loose" with the institution of marriage.2 3  The public policy of a
state cannot be disregarded and then subsequently resurrected
whenever it suits a party's convenience to retract the wrongful
conduct.
2 4
A different situation was present in the celebrated case of
Krause v. Krause.25  The principle there formulated is that a
husband who has obtained an invalid decree of divorce in a sister
state, and who thereafter remarries, shall be estopped from asserting
its invalidity in a separation action brought by the wife of the second
marriage. As stated previously, an existing valid marriage is a
necessary prerequisite to an action for separation. The husband,
in the Krause case, had not been validly divorced from his wife.
Therefore, he could not validly enter into a subsequent marriage while
she was living. This defendant, however, had attempted to do so.
Although unable to hold the second marriage valid, the court, in
estopping the husband from collaterally attacking the validity of the
decree which purported to dissolve the former marriage, was able
(1st Dep't 1947), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 800, 78 N.E.2d 20 (1948). "Where
persons having no complicity in the divorce proceedings have legitimate in-
terests in a determination of the validity of the divorce, they may arouse
the State's interest and institute an inquiry, which our courts will entertain, to
ascertain the validity of a divorce decree, by a foreign State as to persons
alleged to have been at the time residents of this State." See In the Matter
of Lindgren's Estate, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E.2d 849 (1944); Urquhart v.
Urquhart, 272 App. Div. 60, 69 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1st Dep't 1947).
22272 App. Div. 306, 70 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd mern., 297
N.Y. 800, 78 N.E.2d 20 (1948). Accord, Hyman v. Hyman, supra note 15.
In Mintz v. Mintz, 34 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 1942), it was held that although
the sister state decree had no effect upon the right of either party to a full
adjudication of their matrimonial status, the procurer was estopped because
the present separation action was inconsistent with the decree he procured in
the sister state.
23 "Public policy requires that parties not be permitted to slip in and out
of marriages when it serves their whim to do so." Hollis v. Hollis, 6 Misc.
2d 208, 209-10, 159 N.Y.S.2d 917, 919 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
24 See Schuman v. Schuman, 137 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Finan v.
Finan, 47 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
25 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940).
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to confer upon the second wife all the incidents of a true wife
for the purposes of the separation action.26  The Krause case is a
good example of the judicial scorn for those who flagrantly dis-
regard the statutory divorce laws, and then seek to avoid the
consequences of their acts. It is distinguishable from the rule of the
Stevens case in that, there, the objective of the husband's counter-
claim for divorce was not inconsistent with his prior objective even
though the previous decree was invalid. The court, in the Stevens
case, could properly pronounce judgment on the status of the parties
because both parties to the true marriage were before the court and
they had not remarried. In the Krause case, the husband was not
asking the court to pronounce judgment upon the marital status
between himself and the true wife but instead was seeking to avoid
the consequences of his attempted marriage to the plaintiff.
It should be noted that although the court, through the applica-
tion of the estoppel, is permitting limited extraterritorial effect to
the invalid decree, it is in no wise validating it. It is only the
procurer, in this instance, who is being estopped from asserting its
invalidity. The principle of the cases may be interpreted as the
imposition of a judicial impediment resulting from an act which is
regarded as the successful perpetration of a fraud on the foreign
court, and an attack upon the marital philosophy of this state. New
York, through its legislature, has declared the method through
which, and the grounds for which, the dissolution of a marriage may
be decreed within its jurisdiction. When a domiciliary has disregarded
the legislative attitude toward divorce and has fraudulently procured
an invalid decree of divorce in a more liberal jurisdiction, he has
violated the policy of this state. He will not be allowed to recant
when the probability is that he is motivated solely by a desire to
secure some immediate benefit dependent upon the pre-decree status.
This may be a means of deterring similar conduct by other domicil-
iaries of the state.
Estoppel Against the Non-procuring Spouse
It is only just that the spouse not appearing in the fraudulent
divorce proceeding should not be adversely affected by the invalid
decree. Whether he may be estopped from collaterally attacking
the decree at a future date, however, depends upon his subsequent
26 Accord, Stevely v. Stevely, 254 App. Div. 743, 4 N.Y.S.2d 69 (2d Dep't
1938) (memorandum opinion). See also People ex rel. Shrady v. Shrady, 47
Misc. 333, 95 N.Y. Supp. 991 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1905) ; Carbone v. Carbone, 166
Misc. 924, 2 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1938). There the husband did not
obtain the decree but remarried on the basis of it. It was his first wife who
procured the invalid decree of divorce. The court estopped him from
collaterally attacking its validity and made him provide for the support of the
second wife.
1961 ] NOTES
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
activity. The problem cannot be determined solely from his conduct
at the time the decree is obtained. Thus, in the case of Kelsey v.
Kelsey,27 the wife had obtained an invalid decree of divorce in a
sister state and had subsequently remarried. The first husband in-
stituted an action for divorce based on the adultery of the wife
during her subsequent de facto marriage. Prior to the action, the
plaintiff had also remarried. 28 The fact of the husband's remarriage
was held to estop him from collaterally attacking the invalid divorce
decree. The apparent rationale of the court was that the husband
could not take advantage of the decree by marriage, and then after
such an overt manifestation of his acquiescence, seek to collaterally
attack it in a New York court. 29  The case is distinguishable from
the Stevens remedy in that here the parties had remarried. Also,
the decision is analogous to the doctrine of recrimination, which
would also prohibit the granting of a divorce.30 If the non-procuring
spouse, after a remarriage,31 sought an annulment of the second
marriage and a declaration that the decree his real wife obtained was
invalid, there is authority to the effect that such affirmative relief
would be denied.3 2
27204 App. Div. 116, 197 N.Y. Supp. 371 (4th Dep't 1922), aff'd mer.,
237 N.Y. 520, 143 N.E. 726 (1923).
28 It is still unsettled which state law controls the validity of a marriage
performed following the procurement of an invalid decree of divorce. Some
courts have held that it is the state of the domicile of the parties at the time
of the marriage. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N.Y. 341, 99 N.E. 845(1912); Bell v. Little, 204 App. Div. 235, 197 N.Y. Supp. 674 (4th Dep't
1922), aff'd inem., 237 N.Y. 519, 143 N.E. 726 (1923). Other courts hold
that it is the state wherein the marriage is performed. Brown v. Brown, 282
App. Div. 726, 122 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d Dep't 1953) (memorandum decision),
aff'd inem., 306 N.Y. 788, 118 N.E.2d 603 (1954); Apelbaum v. Apelbaum,
7 App. Div. 2d 911, 183 N.Y.S.2d 54 (2d Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision).
29 Accord, Mountain v. Mountain, 109 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sup. Ct. 1951). Cf.
Carbulon v. Carbulon, 293 N.Y. 375, 57 N.E.2d 59 (1944) (cannot assert
that the marriage contract remained unaffected by the decree and thereafter
marry another); Shilman v. Shilman, 105 Misc. 461, 174 N.Y. Supp. 385(Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd mem., 230 N.Y. 554, 130 N.E. 890 (1920).30 N.Y. Civ. PRtAc. Acr § 1153 (4). If both parties are guilty of adultery
a divorce cannot be obtained.
31 A remarriage by the non-procuring spouse would estop him from claiming
his distributive share when the true wife died. Matter of Bingham, 265
App. Div. 463, 39 N.Y.S.2d 756 (2d Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied,
290 N.Y. 929 (1943). Decedent had procured the invalid decree of divorce in
the sister state. Nevertheless, the fact that the husband had remarried estopped
him from collaterally attacking the invalid decree.
32 Packer v. Packer, 6 App. Div. 2d 464, 179 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1st Dep't
1958); Marrero v. Marrero, 15 Misc. 2d 999, 183 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct.
1959). But see Landsman v. Landsman, 302 N.Y. 45, 96 N.E.2d 81 (1950),
where the court held the marriage to be void. This case is distinguishable
because there the action to annul the marriage was instituted by the second
husband who was not involved in the former marital action. The case is also
distinguishable on the ground that the former action had not been fraudulent
but the wife had remarried prior to the decree becoming effective. The court
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Estoppel Against the Second Spouse of the Procurer
The history of the applicability of estoppel in this area is en-
igmatic. The uncertainty prevalent in the application is exemplified
by the case of Dover v. Kitchel.3 3 Previous to this action, the
plaintiff had been sued for separation. Disappointed with his wife's
success, he instituted an action against his former attorneys for their
alleged negligence in failing to collaterally attack an invalid decree
of divorce that the wife had previously obtained in a sister state
against her first husband. The attorneys alleged that the second
husband (plaintiff) had instigated, financed and generally sponsored
the procurement of the invalid decree and had advised the wife
that she was at liberty to contract a valid second marriage. The at-
torneys contended that these facts, had they been presented in the
separation action, would have estopped the second husband from
collaterally attacking the wife's invalid decree of divorce. The court
denied the motion to strike the attorneys' affirmative defense, stating
that after investigation of the case law, the only reasonable view was
that the state of the law was unsettled in relation to the doctrine of
estoppel. 84 It could not be said with assurance that the presentation
of all the facts would or would not give rise to an estoppel.
In Kaufman v. Kaufmlan,35 the husband sought an annulment,
alleging that the marriage was void because the wife had procured
an invalid decree of divorce from her first husband. The wife, in
her defense, introduced evidence tending to show that the plaintiff
husband had induced her to procure the invalid decree and had
financed her trip to the jurisdiction where she was granted the
divorce. The court held that it would be unconscionable to allow
the husband to avoid the responsibility for these acts after he had
lived with this woman for only so long as it pleased him. The court
did not state that the parties were validly married, but merely
refused to grant him affirmative relief from his situation. He was
stated that this marriage was void ab initio which would prevent any counter-
active estoppel even though conceding that the husband had come into court
with unclean hands; the inference being that in other marital actions where
an estoppel is applied there is a marriage performed after a prima facie
decree of divorce is obtained. See the next section in the text for a general
discussion of the latter problem.
33 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County Nov. 1, 1950) 124 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1950,
p. 1059, col. 3, aff'd mem., 278 App. Div. 909, 105 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1st Dep't
1951).
34 "It may not be easy to detect in the mass of decisions . . . any special
consistency in dealing with the question of estoppel . .. but the confusion is
most evident in cases where relief is sought by the second husband."
Rosenberg v. Perles, 182 Misc. 727, 731, 50 N.Y.S.2d 24, 27 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
A recent case illustrates that this uncertainty is still with us. See Beavers
v. Beavers, 11 Misc. 2d 247, 177 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed,
6 App. Div. 2d 1041, 281 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1st Dep't 1958).
35 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N.Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dep't 1917).
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estopped from attacking the wife's decree because if affirmative relief
were to be granted, it would be tantamount to judicial sanctioning of
such conduct.3 6
The Court of Appeals was presented with the converse situation
in Fischer v. Fischer.3 7  There, the wife, who had procured the
invalid decree of divorce from her first husband, sued her alleged
second husband for separation. She had succeeded in the lower
courts because of the similarity to the Kaufman case; in other words,
the husband was estopped from collaterally attacking her invalid
decree of divorce from her first husband. The court noted that it had
not reviewed the Kaufman case, and that even if approval of its
doctrine were to be assumed, the nature of the action and the facts
of the instant case were so distinguishable, that it would prevent ap-
plication of that rule. In the case before the court, the second
husband was not demanding affirmative relief from his situation,
whereas the second husband in the Kaufman case had demanded
affirmative relief. The Fischer court allowed the second husband to
prove the plaintiff's first marriage and deny her allegations con-
cerning her marriage to him.3 8  The complaint was dismissed because
she failed to prove a valid second marriage as recognized by the laws
of New York State.3 9  The composite result of the Kaufman and
Fischer cases evinces a judicial attitude of reluctance to aid either
party in securing a decree in New York which would in any
manner sanction his or her former conduct. The decisions are dis-
tinguishable from the Krause case, where the court decreed a separa-
tion in favor of the wife when in fact no marriage existed, because,
there, the plaintiff-wife had not aided and abetted in the procurement
of the invalid divorce. The justice of the rule is apparent. The
court will not allow the second husband who has unduly aided the
wife to procure an invalid divorce, and who has married her, to
disclaim that relationship through a demand for affirmative relief.
Nor will it allow the wife, who actually has procured the invalid
divorce, to enforce any of the rights of a true wife in a marital
action. The former is achieved through the application of an
36 Accord, Bonney v. Bonney, 65 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd men;.,
271 App. Div. 1060, 70 N.Y.S.2d 133 (4th Dep't 1947). See Campbell v.
Campbell, 164 Misc. 647, 1 N.Y.S.2d 619 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937). In Hubbard
v. Hubbard, 228 N.Y. 81, 126 N.E. 508 (1920), the court stated: "The
plaintiff, assuredly, is not entitled to protection against the marriage ...
[H]e instigated the procurement of the divorce. The moral or legal principles
adopted by the state will not be weakened or deteriorated by refusal to
declare unlawful and void the marriage between the parties." Id. at 87, 126
N.E. at 510. (Emphasis added.)
37254 N.Y. 463, 173 N.E. 680 (1930).
3 Cf. Amerling v. Amerling, 180 Misc. 701, 41 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct.
1943), appeal dismissed, 270 App. Div. 935, 62 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dep't 1946).
39 Accord, Schein v. Schein, 169 Misc. 608, 8 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
But see Oldham v. Oldham, 174 Misc. 22, 19 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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estoppel; the latter, through the inability to prove an existing mar-
riage. It is to be remembered that the Stevens remedy applies only
to the parties of the original marriage when they have not remarried.
That remedy is more apparent than real.
In Davis v. Davis,40 the second husband, although he did not
aid in the procuring of the decree, had full knowledge of it. How-
ever, he had obtained legal opinion to the effect that the wife was at
liberty to remarry. He had persuaded her to marry him. Subse-
quently, he instituted an action for the annulment of the marriage.
The court held that these facts would be insufficient to raise an
estoppel against him, notwithstanding the fact that he was demanding
affirmative relief from his situation. The distinguishing fact was that
he had entered the marriage in good faith, with the belief that she
was able to contract a second marriage.4 ' In Heller v. Heller,
42
the second husband, although he did not aid in the procurement of
the prior invalid divorce of the wife, had full knowledge of its
invalidity before he married. After the birth of a child, he informed
the wife that the divorce was invalid and therefore they were not
validly married. Nevertheless, he continued to cohabit with her.
He subsequently commenced an action to annul the marriage. The
Appellate Division, Second Department, held that because of his
conduct, he was estopped from collaterally attacking' the invalid
decree. 43 Although affirming the Appellate Division in the denial
of affirmative relief, the Court of Appeals expressly reserved the
questiory of estoppel, and held the wife's decree of divorce entitled
to recognition under the "rule of comity."
Subsequently, in Maloney v. Maloney,44 the supreme court
stated that the rule of the Kaufman case had been overruled and dis-
approved in the Fischer and Davis cases.45  The decision was af-
40279 N.Y. 657, 18 N.E.2d 301 (1938).
411n Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N.Y. 131, 188 N.E. 279 (1933), the court
held that there would be no estoppel applied against the second husband be-
cause he only advised the wife (plaintiff) to go to the sister state to obtain a
divorce.
42259 App. Div. 852, 19 N.Y.S.2d 509 (2d Dep't 1940) (memorandum
decision), aff'd nme., 285 N.Y. 572, 33 N.E. 247 (1941).
43 See Brunel v Brunel, 64 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1946), where the wife
ceased living with the husband when she acquired full knowledge of the in-
validity of the divorce decree and it was held that in these circumstances there
would be no estoppel applied against her.
4422 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1924 [sic]), aff'd nein., 262 App. Div.
936, 29 N.Y.S.2d 419 (4th Dep't 1941), aff'd mer., 288 N.Y. 532, 41
N.E.2d 934 (1942).
45Id. at 344. The court also stated that the Kaufman decision was over-
ruled by Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N.Y. 131, 188 N.E. 279 (1933). However
it is to be noted that the court in the Lefferts case did not refer to the
Kaufman decision and the cases may be distinguished by the fact that in
the Lefferts case the second husband merely advised the wife to go to the
sister state to obtain a divorce.
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firmed by the appellate courts on other grounds. However, subsequent
lower court opinions have similarly interpreted the Fischer and Davis
cases. An example of the departure from the principle deduced
from the Kaufinan and Fischer cases, viz., denial of affirmative relief,
is Heusner v. Heusner.46 There, the second husband advised the
divorce, paid the expenses, and even accompanied the wife to the
jurisdiction where she began the fraud that resulted in her being
granted a divorce (invalid). After their marriage, she subsequently
instituted an action for separation. The second husband counter-
claimed for annulment of the marriage. The court held that it was
no longer able to follow the decision in the Kaufman case. 47  There-
fore, since the husband could not be estopped from collaterally at-
tacking the invalid decree of divorce, the court was compelled to
grant the husband's annulment. The court noted that this decision
was in accordance with the recent authority of the Davis case. It is
difficult to sustain the position of the court in light of the fact that
in the Davis case the second husband entered the marriage with the
belief that the wife could validly contract the second marriage,
whereas in Heusner 48 no such element was present. In Honig v.
Honig,49 the lower court estopped the second husband from collater-
ally attacking his wife's previous invalid sister state divorce. The
second husband had financed the fraudulent divorce action, and was
generally helpful in facilitating her trip to the sister state. Subse-
quently, the wife commenced an action for separation. The Second
Department, in a memorandum decision, reversed the holding of the
lower court, stating that the estoppel invoked in the Krause case
does not seem to operate against a person who does not procure
the invalid decree." It would seem that this court established the
48 181 Misc. 1015, 42 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
a7 After a lengthy discussion in which the court attempted to distinguish the
decisions where an estoppel had been applied, and noting the recent tendency
of the cases away from the application of estoppel, the court added, almost
as an afterthought, that it may no longer be necessary "to apply the principle
of estoppel to save the plaintiff and the child from becoming public charges.
Recent legislation provides ample relief (Civ. Prac. Act, §1140;§ 1140-a, added by L. 1940, ch. 226). [Providing that the court after
granting an annulment may in their discretion award support to the wife.]
In any event the child is the legitimate issue of both parties (Civ. Prac.
Act, § 1135) [court may direct support of issue] and is entitled to be
supported by the father, the defendant herein, with custody to the plaintiff."
Id. at 1018, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
48The court also stated that its decision was in accord with Slater v.
Kenny, 265 App. Div. 963, 38 N.Y.S.2d 595 (2d Dep't 1942) (memorandum
decision), reversing 176 Misc. 690 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; however, in that case
there had never been an attempt to dissolve the first marriage; the wife
remarried without even an invalid divorce decree.
49 181 Misc. 251, 43 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1943), rev'd inem., 267 App.
Div. 908, 47 N.Y.S.2d 623 (2d Dep't) (memorandum decision), appeal
disinissed, 293 N.Y. 856, 59 N.E.2d 444 (1944).
50 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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general rule that the application of estoppel is to be limited to the
actual procurer of the invalid decree. 51 However, a later decision
in the same department indicates that when there are strong equi-
table considerations, the Kaufman rule will still be applied, and the
party seeking affirmative relief will be estopped. In Lodati v.
Lodati,5 u the plaintiff's second husband financed the procurement of
the invalid divorce in the sister state and obtained an attorney to
conduct the action. After she was granted the divorce, plaintiff ad-
vised her that she was at liberty to marry him. However, the
plaintiff's motive for marriage was to achieve a dependency status
under the then Selective Service Act. He even adopted a child by
•the wife's former marriage to retain his deferred status. When
the Selective Service regulations were again amended and deferment
on these grounds was no longer permissible, he instituted an action
to declare the nullity of the marriage. The lower court dismissed
the complaint because of "unclean hands." The Second Depart-
ment affirmed the decision, and cited as its authority the Kaufman,
Krause, and Heller cases.53 The court stated that any case to the
contrary is distinguishable on its facts. In the same year as the
Lodati decision, a supreme court within the First Department, in
effect, followed the Kaufman rule, where the second husband had
actually engineered and arranged the specific procedures for the
wife's procurement of a divorce in another jurisdiction from the
first husband. He thereafter sought an annulment after having lived
with the wife for twenty-three years and having raised three children.
Here, as in the Lodati case, there were strong equitable consid-
erations. Therefore, an estoppel would be applicable to the second
husband.54
Thereafter, the First Department, in Jackson z,. Jackson,55 held
that counselling and defraying the expenses of the procurement of
the invalid decree of divorce by the second husband would not
create an estoppel. Although the facts seemed almost identical with
those in the Kaufman case, the court stated that the Kaufman case
had no application to the facts there presented, and in any event, the
Kaufman rule had not met with approval, citing as its authority the
Fischer and Davis cases.
The lower courts have been unable to find any consistency in the
reasoning of the various appellate opinions, and one court stated that
51 Accord, Gruttemeyer v. Gruttemeyer, 285 App. Div. 1185, 141 N.Y.S.2d
227 (2d Dep't 1955) (memorandum decision).
52 49 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mer., 268 App. Div. 1003, 52 N.Y.S.2d
119 (2d Dep't 1944).
53 See text accompanying notes 25, 35, 42 supra.
54 Pandelides v. Pandelides, 182 Misc. 819, 47 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
55274 App. Div. 43, 79 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1st Dep't 1948).
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although it was unconscionable to grant affirmative relief to the
second husband, the court was constrained to do so.5"
Recent lower court opinions state that up to the Krause de-
cision, there was an estoppel applied against the second husband,
but since then, the application of estoppel has been limited. 57 Seem-
ingly, the Krause decision, when written, was a liberalization of
estoppel. However, the court, in Beavers v. Beavers,5 stated that
"there is no public policy of this State so rigid and inflexible as to
require a court of equity to ignore the brazen efforts of a person
to flout the law on one hand and on the other seek to invoke the same
law in his favor." 59
As stated above, the Kaufman decision has neither been ex-
pressly approved nor overruled by the Court of Appeals. The rule
of the case may be defended on the ground that it deters unconscion-
able conduct after a party has greatly aided another in a fraudulent
attempt to circumvent the New York divorce law. However, the
application of the estoppel is no less difficult than just, because he is
not legally a party to the former invalid divorce action. The specific
acts required of him, to call forth the application of the e.itoppel,
have necessarily been couched in general terms. Mere suggestion or
advisement has not been held to suffice. The decision in Kaufman is
categorized as mostly negative in effect. It is denial of the right
of the second spouse to have the court declare that no valid marriage
exists. However, this is denied to him only when he demands
affirmative relief from the de facto marriage that he is responsible
for, no less than his de facto spouse. If it is not he, but instead his
spouse, the procurer of the invalid decree of divorce, who demands
the affirmative relief, for example a separation, he may, as was held
in the Fischer case, interpose the invalidity of -her decree as a de-
fense. He may, when the procurer of the invalid decree demands
affirmative relief from her alleged second marriage, show the inability
of the complainant to enter into a valid marriage. Thus, the court
is not compelled to sanction the actual procurer's evasion of the
controlling divorce law. It may be said that one of the Kaufnian
decision's salutary effects is that, although no marriage exists, the
second spouse may not compel the courts to aid him. Although there
has been some remedial legislation, 60 the rule of this particular section
is of great value to society because of the complexity of the situation.
56 Swanston v. Swanston, 82 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
57 See Beavers v. Beavers, 11 Misc. 2d 247, 177 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct.),
appeal dismissed, 6 App. Div. 2d 1041, 181 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1st Dep't 1958).
58 Ibid.59 1d. at 250, 177 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
60 See note 47 supra.
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Estoppel Against the Party Who Procures a "Mail-Order" Divorce
In the main, the early lower court cases involved situations
where the procurer of the mail-order divorce was seeking the same
relief as the decree purported to grant. An estoppel was not applied
because the procurer's position was not deemed inconsistent; he was
seeking to terminate the marriage in both actions.61 However, when
the problem reached the Court of Appeals, all principles of estoppel
were cast aside because of the judicial compulsion to declare the
utter wortliessness of such a decree.62 In Caldwell v. Caldwell,e3
it was held that one who obtains a mail-order decree and subse-
quently remarries is not estopped to plead and prove the invalidity of
such decree in a separation action instituted by the second spouse.
The court stated that no rights of any kind emanate from this decree.
The rationale of the court was that when there is a mail-order decree
of divorce, the divorcing court has not the slightest semblance of
jurisdiction which is present when a party procures an invalid decree
of divorce in a sister state. However, although no rights may
emanate from this decree, it may be a foundation for the exclusion of
the surviving spouse's distributive share in the estate of the deceased
spouse, when the survivor has procured a mail-order divorce.
6 4
81 Shannon v. Shannon, 247 App. Div. 790, 286 N.Y. Supp. 27 (2d Dep't
1936) (per curiam). There the divorce was based on the wife's adultery
during a subsequent marriage which she was enabled to enter into on the basis
of the decree. McDermott v. McDermott, 252 App. Div. 875, 299 N.Y. Supp.
956 (2d Dep't 1937) (memorandum decision); Massacar v. Massacar, 37
N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1942). But see Shilman v. Shilman, 105 Misc. 461,
174 N.Y. Supp. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd mer., 188 App. Div. 908, 175
N.Y. Supp. 681 (1st Dep't 1919), aff'd mem., 230 N.Y. 554, 130 N.E. 890
(1920).
62 Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E.2d 423 (1943) (The court stated
that the rule of the Starbuck case, i. e., estoppel applied against the procurer
seeking to enforce a private claim or demand, would still be applicable to the
procurer of the decree.); Vose v. Vose, 280 N.Y. 779, 21 N.E2d 616 (1939)
(per curiam). Cf. Wynn v. Wynn, 189 Misc. 96, 68 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct.
1947). See In re Anonymous, 274 App. Div. 89, 80 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1st
Dep't 1948) (admonishment of lawyers who aid in obtaining mail-order
decrees).
,6 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948). Defendant obtained a mail-order
decree of divorce from his first wife and shortly thereafter married the
plaintiff in another state. In a separation action brought by the second wife
the defendant was permitted to plead the invalidity of the mail-order decree.
The Caldwell case may be interpreted as sub silentio overruling the Starbuck
principle in this area as mentioned in the Querze case, supra note 62.
But see Dorn v. Dor, 202 Misc. 1057, 112 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 1952),
aff'd, 282 App. Div. 597, 126 N.Y.S.2d 713 (2d Dep't 1953) (per curiam). The
procurer of a mail-order decree of divorce was estopped from maintaining
an action to enforce a separation agreement, such action not requiring a
determination of the marital status.
84 1n the Matter of Estate of Rathscheck, 300 N.Y. 346, 90 N.E2d 887
(1950).
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If either party to the former divorce action without the United
States has made some form of personal appearance, color of juris-
diction will be found. The decree of divorce will not be then
categorized as a mail-order divorce. Therefore, an estoppel may be
applied.6 5
Conclusion
In the majority of marital actions in which the question of
estoppel arises, ostensibly at issue is whether the parties shall be
constrained to continue to maintain the relationship of husband and
wife toward each other. It is to be noted that notwithstanding the
application of the estoppel and its concomitant results, the court can
in no wise validate the de facto marriage. There can be no marriage
by estoppel. The parties may be prosecuted for bigamy 66 and, in
the absence of statute, the children would be considered illegitimate.67
The raison d'9tre of the estoppel has a more immediate purpose. It
is to prevent injustice. When an individual domiciled in New York
decides to terminate his marriage for a cause other than adultery,
he must look to a more liberal jurisdiction. In our system of
sovereign states, it is believed that the state has the absolute right to
prescribe the various causes for which a marriage may be dissolved.
It has that right although there is only one party domiciled within
the court's jurisdiction. The spouse must decide whether he will
conform to this state's social mores and legal restrictions or evade
65 Caswell v. Caswell, 111 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem., 280 App.
Div. 969, 117 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1st Dep't 1952) (second spouse estopped when
the wife, who had procured the decree, had appeared therein, and her first
husband was represented by counsel); Leviton v. Leviton, 6 N.Y.S.2d 535
(Sup. Ct), modified, 254 App. Div. 670, 4 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dep't 1938)
(procurer estopped when both spouses had appeared in the former divorce
action); Mountain v. Mountain, 109 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (second
spouse estopped when the wife who had procured the decree was represented
by her counsel and the first husband had appeared personally) ; In the Matter
of Estate of Fleischer, 192 Misc. 777, 80 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Surr. Ct. 1948)
(non-procuring spouse estopped when it was found that she had appeared by
counsel and the procurer appeared personally) ; Carbone v. Carbone, 166 Misc.
924, 2 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1938) (non-procuring spouse who sub-
sequently remarried was estopped when it appeared that he was personally
served within the jurisdiction of the court although he did not appear in
the action and the procuring spouse did appear). But see Marum v. Marum,
8 App. Div. 2d 975, 190 N.Y.S.2d 812 (2d Dep't 1959) (memorandum de-
cision) (spouse not estopped to assert the invalidity of the divorce decree
when he personally appeared because he had stated in the divorce action that
he would not relinquish his New York residence). See also Alfaro v. Alfaro,
5 App. Div. 2d 770, 169 N.Y.S.2d 943 (2d Dep't 1958).
66 People v. Harlow, 9 Cal. App. 2d 643, 50 P.2d 1052 (1935); State v.
Armington, 25 Minn. 29 (1878); Van Fossen v. State, 37 Ohio St. 317
(1881).
67 Olmsted v. Olmsted, 190 N.Y. 458, 83 N.E. 569 (1908).
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them in a brief extra-domiciliary holiday under the approving cer-
tificate of a jurisdiction which facilitates the latter conduct. Estoppel
is but one answer to the question of invalid divorce. The ex parte
action for divorce is the main problem.
To suggest uniform divorce laws would be futile because of the
conflict which exists between the traditional and liberal grounds for
divorce. An approach no less startling than practical would be
in the field of congressional action. Under article 3, section 2 of
the federal constitution, Congress controls the jurisdiction of both
state and federal courts in controversies between citizens of different
states. An ex parte divorce action is a controversy between citizens
of different states when one spouse has sought the liberal jurisdiction.
In that event the case would be required to be transferred from the
state court to the federal court where the defendant is domiciled.
The law that would be applied is the law of the last matrimonial
domicile. Thus the plaintiff could gain no advantage from his brief
residence in the liberal jurisdiction.68
Presently, estoppel is the modus operandi to prevent untoward
results. However, its efficacy is too limited to obviate the main
problem. Another aspect of the application of the estoppel is
that, as some writers have suggested, there is little likelihood of
criminal prosecution and therefore it is not probable that the
divorce decree will be attacked. They contend that a realistic view
of the divorce situation would result in the conclusion that there
is no requirement of domicile as a prerequisite for jurisdiction to
render a divorce.6 9 However, the fact remains that the estoppel is
generally applied to prevent an individual from gaining an inequitable
advantage. The decree of divorce is invalid; and though many times
it may remain unquestioned, the fault does not lie with the estoppel
but lies in the enforcement of the criminal laws.
68 Mayers, Ex Parte Divorce; A Proposed Federal Remedy, 54 CoLum.
L. REV. 54 (1954).
69 See Harper, The Validity of Void Divorces, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 158(1930); Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
335 (1935).
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